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Abstract. The TRUSTZONE technology, available in the vast majority of recent
ARM processors, allows the execution of code inside a so-called secure world.
It effectively provides hardware-isolated areas of the processor for sensitive data
and code, i.e., a trusted execution environment (TEE). The OP-TEE framework
provides a collection of toolchain, open-source libraries and secure kernel specif-
ically geared to develop applications for TRUSTZONE. This paper presents an
in-depth performance- and energy-wise study of TRUSTZONE using the OP-TEE
framework, including secure storage and the cost of switching between secure
and unsecure worlds, using emulated and hardware measurements.
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1 Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are expected to offer the pervasive computing that was
promised at its advent [47]. The economic impact of the IoT ecosystem has created
many new business opportunities and is expected to continue growing rapidly. As a
result, the number of devices owned per user is anticipated to increase up to 26 by
2020 [44]. ARM, expects 275bn active devices by 2025 - a 11× improvement over
2019 [6] - while already having sold 100bn processors. For instance, Figure 1 reports
the sales for ARM processors in the last 20 years.
These IoT devices gather, distribute and process information on their own, effec-
tively pushing intelligence to edge devices. Due to their nature, these devices are mostly
nomad: easy to relocate, designed as wearable, embedded in vehicles or left in remote
locations. As such, assets need to be protected from attackers, in particular those eas-
ily subject to physical tampering. Hence, ensuring that confidential data is processed
in a secure manner, even in hostile environments, remains a challenging prerequisite
for such devices. Indeed, an attacker with physical access can relatively easily inspect
and modify the execution workflow of any program. Nowadays, even more disturb-
ing attacks not requiring physical access are surfacing [51], reinforcing the need to
exploit hardware-based security mechanisms when available. Hardware-based protec-
tions offer an additional security layer, by physically separating processing of secure
and non-secure data components. These can be dedicated processing chips (hardware
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Fig. 1: Sales and popularity of ARM processors in the last 20 years [5,4]
security modules –HSM–), or regular chips to which security extensions were added.
Examples of the latter include Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (i.e., SGX [21]) since
the Skylake architecture (2015), or ARM’s TRUSTZONE [7] since ARMv6 (2008).
ARM devices are often battery-powered and must therefore make optimal use of
their limited energy capacity. This is especially true nowadays, when battery capacity
is becoming the limiting factor when deploying new functionalities. Despite the avail-
ability of such devices on the market, to the best of our knowledge we could not find
a public study on the performance and energy-related consumption for these security
extensions.
The contributions of this work are as follows. We begin by providing the first public
experimental analysis of the performance and energy requirements of the TRUSTZONE
security extensions based on hands-on metrics. Second, we report on the advantages
and limitations of OP-TEE [26], an open-source framework that supports TRUSTZONE.
Third, we provide a methodology to extend the kernel of OP-TEE in order to offer new
syscalls inside TRUSTZONE. We leverage this methodology to implement two new ad-
ditional syscalls, e.g., to fetch thermal metrics and for secure time measurements in
the TRUSTZONE. Finally, we report on our in-depth experimental analysis along sev-
eral dimensions (including energy) of the current secure processing capabilities offered
by some widely popular IoT devices (i.e., Raspberry Pi) shipping TRUSTZONE pro-
cessors. Our results are put into perspective by comparing them against an emulated
environment aware of the TRUSTZONE extensions.
The paper is organized as follows. §2 describes the TRUSTZONE architecture and
key concepts of world isolation. §3 explains how the kernel was extended to expose new
syscalls within TRUSTZONE, how all the data was gathered, as well as the hardware
and software tools that were developed. §4 presents our in-depth evaluation using real
hardware and under emulation, for several hardware components (e.g. CPU, memory,
secure storage) and metrics (e.g. performance, energy and power consumption). We
discuss some lessons learned in §5, before concluding in §6.
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Fig. 2: TRUSTZONE components and interaction workflow.
2 Background
This section provides some background on TRUSTZONE. First we define a few terms
used throughout this paper. §2.1 describes TRUSTZONE’s main mechanisms and limi-
tations, while §2.2 introduces OP-TEE.
Rich Execution Environment. The REE (or normal world) is the regular, non-
secure operating system of a device. The memory, registers, and caches are not isolated
or protected by any hardware mechanism. Typically, the REE is not focused on security
and is difficult to review for security vulnerabilities, due to its large size and complexity.
Trusted Execution Environments. Also called TEE or secure OS, it is the so-called
secure world operating system part of the TRUSTZONE specifications. It complies with
the GlobalPlatform’s TEE System Architecture specifications [57], a set of operations
offered to secure applications. These include interactions with persistent (secure) stor-
age [57, Chapter 5], memory [57, Chapter 4.11], and cryptographic operations [57,
Chapter 6]. As such, a secure application can easily be ported to another platform, due
to the standardized nature of available services. Similar to what a non-secure operating
system offers to its running applications, the TEE offers access to special services only
available to secure applications (such as the secure storage feature, which we evaluate).
This environment has a small footprint, contrary to a full-fledged operating system, and
only implements the very minimal set of features required to operate. Its small size
makes it simpler to review for security vulnerabilities, as any could potentially compro-
mise all secure applications.
Trusted Application. A trusted application (TA), also called secure application is
designed to be run exclusively inside the secure world. It uses services provided by
the TEE kernel to access resources, specifically: (1) disk via the secure storage subsys-
tem exclusively, (2) TCP/IP sockets, (3) memory allocation, (4) other custom services.
Trusted applications provide services to either standard userland programs or other TAs.
OP-TEE expects TAs to be written in C.
2.1 TRUSTZONE in a nutshell
This section describes the main components of the TRUSTZONE architecture, also de-
picted in Figure 2 alongside their interfaces.
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Overview. TRUSTZONE is a hardware feature implemented in recent ARM proces-
sors. It enables physical separation of different execution environments, namely TEE
and REE. Its working principle is very similar to a hypervisor, the main difference be-
ing that no emulation is performed and that all isolation is offered at the hardware level.
Both secure (TEE) and normal worlds (REE) share the underlying physical processor.
The secure world has unrestricted access to memory regions, hardware and devices.
This is realized by using an additional addressing line, the NS (Non Secure) bit. Hard-
ware checks performed by the TZASC (TRUSTZONE Address Space Controller) [42,50]
determines, if the access is authorized based on this NS-bit.
Memory. Parts of the memory can be isolated for exclusive use by the secure world
by means of special hardware support. The memory management unit (MMU) is secure-
world aware, and secure and non-secure descriptors are stored alongside each other.
The differentiation is done by the Non-secure TLB ID (NSTID) [12], an extra bit of the
TLB. The secure applications (TAs) must fit in the on-chip memory. Due to high costs
of the secure memory, it is usually limited in size, in the order of 3-5MB. Hence, TAs
are expected to have small memory footprints and only contain the minimal subset of
features required. Clearly, this reduces the attack surface exposed by TAs.
Interrupts. The Fast Interrupt (FIQ) secure interrupt mode is used exclusively by
devices residing in a memory region allocated to the secure world. As such, regular
interrupts (IRQ), which are of lower priority, cannot be used to prevent the secure world
from executing, in particular if a physical secure clock (i.e., RTC) is used. Secure clocks
are crucial to ensure a TA is safely executed: an external clock is a common attack vector
and can be easily tampered with [53]. Latest ARM processors include secure clocks.
World Switching. Switching between worlds requires the state of the processor
to be saved and then restored, respectively when entering and exiting a new world.
Processor registers are saved by the monitor when entering, and restored when leaving
the secure world. The NS-bit is changed accordingly. Normal world applications use
TRUSTZONE indirectly, by invoking functionalities implemented in a dedicated TA.
When in PL-1 [43,1] privilege level, a special hardware instruction, Secure Monitor Call
(SMC), allows switching between worlds. Recent Cortex-A processors [48] support
SMC calls by the kernel in the normal world. Entry to a different world (from secure to
unsecure and vice versa) is done on a core-basis, thus limiting the parallel execution of
TAs to the number of available cores. To enter the secure world, a kernel thread executes
the monitor, which in turn issues the SMC instruction to the CPU [8,29]. Calls to SMC
by a processor not in kernel mode trigger an undefined exception trap. TAs can be called
from userland programs residing in the REE or from other TAs. The latter is particularly
useful to reduce code duplication and to keep the TA’s attack surface minimal. Data is
passed back and forth between worlds by memory pointers or direct copies.
Secure storage. TRUSTZONE supports persistent data storage for TAs using secure
storage. Objects are stored encrypted on disk, and are signed for anti-tampering coun-
termeasure. TAs access the files in cleartext: the TEE layer runs the cryptographic stack
transparently. These files have a unique numeric name based on a counter. An encrypted
index of files is maintained alongside the files. Operations on the index are atomic, en-
suring integrity protection by means of a hash tree data structure that guards the index.
To protect against storage replay attacks, an eMMC storage device (embedded Mul-
On The Performance of ARM TrustZone 5
Framework License Technology
OP-TEE [26] BSD TRUSTZONE
Trustonic TEE [38] Commercial TRUSTZONE
Open TEE [52] Apache License 2.0 TRUSTZONE
OpenEnclaves [23] MIT SGX1 & TRUSTZONE
TLK [54] BSD NVIDIA Tegra
Android Trusty TEE [2] Apache License 2.0 TRUSTZONE1
1: emulated under Intel’s VT
Table 1: Existing frameworks for TEE-based applications.
tiMediaCard, a type of non-volatile, non-removable solid-state storage device [22]) is
required. This security feature is entirely implemented in the eMMC storage in the form
of Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) [55].
Key Management. The key manager starts with a device-specific key, the Secure
Storage Key (SSK). It is derived from two pieces of information unique to each device’s
processor: the chip identifier and the hardware key. The TA Storage Key (TSK) is a per-
TA key, derived from the SSK and the TA’s UUID identifier. The File Encryption Key
(FEK) is a per-file key generated upon file creation. It is used to protect the file contents,
including its metadata, and is encrypted using the TSK.
Resilience to attacks. It is of paramount importance to ensure that only trustworthy
applications are deployed to the secure world. Vulnerabilities in any TA, the TEE or a
compromised secure kernel do compromise the security of the secure world. Prevention
against buffer overflow attacks in the secure world are currently only provided using
basic stack canaries [31]. Future support for ASLR (Address Space Layout Random-
ization) will improve resilience against those attacks. Finally, there exist mitigations
against Meltdown and Spectre speculative execution attacks [15,13,14,16]. Covert data
channels [45] can also be used when required.
2.2 The OP-TEE Trusted OS
While there are few options (Table 1) to develop applications for TEEs, we rely on
OP-TEE, due to its fast development cycle and native support for the TRUSTZONE.
OP-TEE is a security framework that includes several components: a minimal secure-
world operating system (the OP-TEE OS [26]); the tee-supplicant [30], offering normal
world services to the secure world; a complete build toolchain [24], the testing tool [28]
(OPTEE sanity testsuite), a secure privileged layer enabling world switching, a basic
REE image, and several utility functions for developers to implement TAs. OP-TEE is
flexible and can be deployed to platforms for which there exists a manifest, that lists
the dependencies required to build for the platform it describes, as well as its hardware
characteristics. Additionally, the Qemu open source emulator [33] allows to deploy and
evaluate OP-TEE in emulated mode on ubiquitous machines. The TEE interface imple-
mented in OP-TEE is compliant with the GlobalPlatform’s specifications.
Details. OP-TEE imposes a specific interface regarding TA interactions initiated
from the REE. First, a request to load the desired TA is made by passing its UUID
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Fig. 3: Experimental setup and approach used to run our measurements
to TEEC InitializeContext which returns a context object. The UUID is defined at
compile-time and must be unique amongst all TAs. Next, this context is passed to
TEEC OpenSession which returns a session. This session is then used to invoke ac-
tual services in the TA using the TEEC InvokeCommand, which takes as parameters the
service identifier as well as any optional parameters. A single session can be used to call
TEEC InvokeCommand any number of times. Sessions are finally closed using TEEC -
CloseSession and ultimately, the context is closed by calling TEEC FinalizeContext.
To support multiple sessions, the TA must be compiled with the TA FLAG MULTI -
SESSION flag set. OP-TEE signs TAs with a private RSA key, but the toolchain does
not allow a unique key per-TA (all TAs are signed with the same device key). Upon TA
loading, the OP-TEE core checks the integrity of the TA by verifying its signature based
on its signed header. The framework includes a minimal OS that offers services to TAs,
and leverages the tee-supplicant application to access resources residing in user land.
3 Methodology
This section describes the tools and techniques used to carry out our evaluation. We fo-
cus on four metrics : (1) execution time for various types of benchmarks (CPU-bound,
volatile and non-volatile memory), (2) power consumption under different CPU gover-
nors, (3) energy consumption, and (4) thermal behaviour of the CPU.
Hardware Measurement Tools. Energy and power measurements are carried out
using a Power-Z KM001 unit [32], plugged in-between the USB power supply and the
Raspberry Pi device. The variant used in our testbed features two main USB ports (to
provide power and one from where the power is drawn) of the current mainstream USB
types (type A, micro and type C). In our configuration, type A is used for both input and
output of power delivery. An additional (micro) USB port is used to fetch power con-
sumption measurements. The KM001 unit supports different USB protocols, including
USB PD (Power Delivery) 2.0 and Qualcomm QC (QuickCharge) from version 2.0 up
to 4.0. This configuration allows the power used by the Raspberry Pi to be measured
directly as the losses of the power supply itself are not taken into account. We use this
device to measure only power [W] and energy [Wh], for which it produces 1 record per
second. Unfortunately, the software (Figure 3, left) provided by the unit manufacturer
is a closed-source 32-bit Windows binary, and the protocol used to exchange messages
over USB is undocumented. To overcome these limitations, we used the following ap-
proach. Specific markers (e.g. start recording and stop recording) are generated during
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execution of benchmark applications, allowing for precise recording of areas of interest
(Figure 4). These markers are monitored by a custom program (on a separate node) that
pilot the Windows binary (Figure 5). The pilot sends automated messages to the binary
instance using the Win32 API through P/Invoke (Platform Invokation Service) [11] is-
sued by a monitoring program implemented in C#.
CPU Governors. The Linux kernel supports several CPU governors [46], used to
adjust the frequency of each core depending on its load and temperature. Several options
exist: powersave and performance for minimum and maximum operating frequency;
ondemand toggles between the previous two, and a more conservative mode that op-
erates less aggressively; userspace, to manually set the CPU frequency; and schedu-
til, where the frequency is set by the scheduler. The core frequency is increased during
the execution of stressful workloads and reduced right after, for instance when the max-
imum temperature is reached in order to prevent overheating. This is different from a
hardware thermal throttling, which tries to prevent damage caused by excessive heat.
The OP-TEE kernel uses powersave governor by default. This reduces heat output
by reducing the frequency of the core clocks, allowing passive cooling - even without
heatsink - but also negatively impacts performance. In a compute-intensive datacenter,
one would typically use the performance governor. Instead, if energy constraints are
important, the powersave mode is best suited. Our benchmarks consider both gover-
nors and compare them for REE and TEE executions.
Timing issues. Initially, we planned on porting STRESS-NG [36] to run inside
TRUSTZONE. Unfortunately this proved to be not straightforward, given its reliance
on system calls not available inside the TEE kernel. As such, we decided to imple-
ment custom ad-hoc benchmark applications. Execution time is measured using either
the gettimeofday(2) [18] or the clock gettime(3) [10] syscall, which support the
following parameters:
1. CLOCK REALTIME: the realtime clock of the system, can be adjusted by NTP and
thus can go forward and backwards.
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2. CLOCK MONOTONIC: a monotonic time since an unspecified starting point (usually
system startup, as is the case with our setup)
3. CLOCK PROCESS CPUTIME ID: per-process timer
4. CLOCK THREAD CPUTIME ID: thread-specific CPU-time clock
For our experiments we exclusively use CLOCK MONOTONIC. Our benchmarks include
the instrumentation delay, e.g., the overhead introduced by the measurement itself. This
is especially important from the TEE perspective (i.e., inside a TA) where one syscall
can lead to a second one if REE needs to be accessed (e.g., Figure 2-Ò and Figure 2–Ð).
Kernel and OP-TEE modifications. To access and store the monotonic time and
temperature from within a TA using the secure kernel, and to retrieve it later on within
the REE, we extended the kernel with four new system calls: TEE GetCpuTempera-
ture, sys ktraceadd, sys ktraceget and sys ktracereset.
To gather the temperature measurements, we used two methods: (1) software, via
thermal APIs1 and (2) external hardware sensor. Originally, we planned on using a
script to record the temperature at fixed intervals during the CPU stress tests executed
by userland threads. However, since kernel threads executing the TAs have a higher
priority, the userland threads were starved and thus did not produce enough data points.
This is a typical scenario of normal world starvation occurring when TAs monopolize
all cores. We overcome this problem by accessing the CPU temperature from inside the
TA, and sending it periodically to the monitoring software for safekeeping. To use the
temperature gathering syscall from within the TA, we additionally had to implement the
corresponding TEE kernel syscall wrapper. An extensive walkthrough on this process
is given in Appendix A.
4 Evaluation
This section presents our in-depth evaluation and performance analysis, the main con-
tribution of this work. Energy results are always presented by systematically excluding
idle energy consumption, e.g., we only show the energy cost of the given operation. En-
ergy requirements are shown on a per-operation fashion. To prevent thermal throttling,
all tests run while the onboard chip is actively cooled.
Evaluation Settings. We use the Raspberry Pi 3B, a popular yet representative
single-board device, equipped with Broadcom BCM2837 System-On-Chip (1GB of
RAM, ARM Cortex A53 quad core running at 1.2GHz). For some of our measurements,
we compared the hardware experiments against a modified version of the Qemu emula-
tor provided by OP-TEE with support for TRUSTZONE [34]. This mimics the scenario
of an Infrastructure-as-a-Service provider offering access to ARM nodes (as virtual ma-
chines) to cloud tenants without having the corresponding hardware infrastructure and
thus relying on TRUSTZONE virtualization [49]. Qemu uses the Cortex A53 emulation
profile on an Ubuntu host residing on a VMWare ESXi [40] machine equipped with an
i7 6820HQ running at 2.7GHz. Note that the Raspberry Pi 3B lacks support for secure
boot and hardware separation of memory and peripherals [27], hence these aspects of
1 /sys/class/thermal/thermal zone[0-9]+/temp
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Idle BurnGovernor
W BTU/h W BTU/h
ondemand 0.78 2.66 3.08 10.51
performance 0.86 2.93 3.32 11.33
powersave 0.78 2.66 1.65 5.63
Table 2: Average power consump-
tions for idle and burn experiments
(see Figure 6)
the TRUSTZONE ecosystem could not be evaluated and are left for future work. Finally,
we do not override the default secure storage key (SSK) provided by OP-TEE.
Power consumption. We start by measuring the idle and under-stress (burn) power
consumption of our hardware unit. We evaluate how the three different CPU governors
(ondemand, performance, and powersave) behave. The idle measurements use the
standard REE kernel image provided by OP-TEE, without any user-intensive applica-
tions nor TAs running. Burn measurements run the prime benchmark, a single-threaded
TA which computes the first 20000 prime numbers before exiting. We run 8 instances
in parallel, ensuring maximum heat output on the 4 cores. Measurements start 60 sec-
onds after the benchmark instances. Figure 6 shows our results, respectively for idle
(left) and burn (right) experiments. Table 2 shows the average W and BTU/h. We use a
box-and-whiskers plot: the first and third quartile are shown as a colored box, the me-
dian as horizontal black bar. Min/max values are also included. Results for ondemand
and powersave are on par with the ondemand governor, in particular when the CPU
frequency is set at 600MHz. As expected, we observe higher power consumption using
the performance governor even in idle, as the cores are boosted up to 1.2GHz. Overall,
the board’s power consumption is very low, in particular below 1W in idle mode.
Load & unload TAs. Next, we measure the time required to load and unload a TA
inside the TRUSTZONE, respectively executing TEEC InitializeContext [56, Chapter
4.5.2] and TEEC FinalizeContext [56, Chapter 4.5.3] functions. We compare results ob-
tained with a TA of size smaller and another one of size larger than the 512kB L2 cache
of the Broadcom BCM2837 processor, respectively 102kB and 517kB. Our experiments
show no significant difference between TAs of different sizes.
Basic TA operations
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Fig. 7: Basic TA operations: loading, unloading and suc-
cessive calls to load/unload the same TA.
For each configuration, Figure 7
shows average and standard de-
viation over 10k executions. We
include the time spent to execute
an empty function inside the TA
once it is loaded (1.31ms), to
give a baseline of comparison.
Surprisingly, our results do
not show a significant differ-
ences on subsequent loadings
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compared to the first loading,
despite the tee-supplicant is sup-
posed to cache the TA code. We
will investigate this aspect in fu-
ture work.
Context (World) Switching. Switching between worlds is a key operation when
deploying applications that execute inside and outside the TRUSTZONE. To measure the
switching time, we implemented an ad-hoc benchmark made by a host application and
a TA. Both programs record the monotonic time when entering and exiting the world
in which they reside. The host issues a call to an almost empty function, which only
contain time-measuring code. Two calls are made to the TA per session, recording the
time taken to switch between TEE and REE, and vice versa. Figure 8 (left) shows these
results. To evaluate possible caching effects, we also include the results obtained for
all the calls following the first one. As expected, it is more time-consuming to switch
from the REE to the TEE (110µs with the performance-oriented governors) than the
opposite (47µs). The instrumentation delay (Figure 8, center) is the difference between
two consecutive calls to the time measurement function. An increased instrumentation
delay is observed in the TEE compared to the REE, due to the additional world switch.
Finally, we also evaluate the energy spent for calling an empty TA function from the
REE (Figure 8, right). The timer starts and stops when leaving and re-entering the REE,
respectively. The ondemand governor is the most energy-eager (up to 12.1 nWh), while
powersave is the most energy efficient.
Volatile Memory. Next, we consider simple in-memory operations (e.g., read and
write, sequential or at random), for two different sizes of volatile memory (1MB and
100KB) used by the REE and the TEE. We consider inter- (REE←TEE) and intra-
world (e.g., REE↔REE, TEE↔TEE) memory readings, as TRUSTZONE restrictions
prevents reading TEE memory from the REE. We compute the average and standard
deviation over 100 run, always using the high-resolution monotonic counter. Figure 9
shows our results, for the Raspberry Pi device with 3 CPU governors and using Qemu.
Performance of accessing a single byte in TEE memory from the TEE is on par with
accessing REE memory from the TEE, on average 0.01µs, around 2× under emulation.
Interestingly, using memory from within the TEE is also less energy eager (Figure 10),
also verified by the cost of the single operations in the various configurations. We ob-
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serve how the operations in the TEE↔TEE case are on average 2× faster on bare metal
and 1.2× under emulation than in the other cases.
Secure Storage: performance. We evaluate the performance of TRUSTZONE’s se-
cure storage via the corresponding GlobalPlatform’s API implemented by OP-TEE.
Specifically, we benchmark the cost of creating, writing, reading and closing objects in-
side the secure storage area, for two different object sizes (100KB and 1MB), although
current memory allocator limitations prevented to cover some cases [35,19,20,39]. Fig-
ure 11 (left) shows that closing and deleting objects are fast operations, and opening
and writing are the slowest ones. Iterating over objects in the secure storage (e.g., the
execution of a find operation) is slow, up to a few hours in the worst case (Figure 11,
right). Adding more objects in secure storage degrade the results even more (up to
2.01×ob ject count ratio).
Secure storage: cost breakdown. To understand how each low-level syscall af-
fects the performance of a file-system inside the secure storage, we implemented a
simple microbenchmark, inside ree fs create and ree fs write. Specifically, these
tests create and write data into a new object. Figure 14 shows a breakdown cost using
stacked bars for writing and creating files. These two functions are atomic and thus are
surrounded by a monitor (mutex) which adds a considerable delay (not shown) regard-
ing the write operation. The impact is negligible on the create operation. We observe
that opening the file and setting the filename accounts for the most time spent.
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Fig. 11: Secure storage: basic operations (left) and iteration (right)
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Fig. 12: Secure storage: energy measurements for basic operations
Secure Storage: energy. Being a feature often used by nomad devices with low
energy autonomy, we deeply investigate its energy impacts. Figure 12 shows that creat-
ing objects is the most energy-demanding (up to 403µWh), irrelevant of the size. Power
consumption of writing objects is dependent on their size. Interestingly, the ondemand
governor achieves slightly worse results when creating a file, whereas for closing and
deleting files it stands out. Figure 13 shows the energy requirements to iterate over a
single stored object (top) [57, Chapter 5.8] during enumeration of all stored objects in
secure storage or rename (bottom) a single object, when additional 10 or 100 objects
(of the same size) are already in the secure storage. We execute this test for 2 different
file sizes (1kB and 10kB). We observe that the energy required to iterate over a single
object depends on the number of objects stored (in particular when using performance
and ondemand), whereas the size of the object is irrelevant.
CPU Benchmarks. To benchmark the raw performance of the ARM processors of
our units, we implemented and deployed a single-threaded TA that executes a CPU-
bound task, e.g., computes the first 20000 prime numbers. We run multiple instances
concurrently, and while they execute we also gather energy measurements (for all cases
minus the emulation mode). Figure 15 presents these results. As expected, the perfor-
mance governor ensures the fastest computing time. Due to emulation costs, the Qemu
results are the worst ones. As the number of instances exceed the available hardware
On The Performance of ARM TrustZone 13
Secure storage − iterate/rename objects
 0
 4
 8
 12
 16
Iterate over one object
Rename one object
Object size
En
er
gy
 [µ
W
h]
10 objects present
rpi3b ondemand rpi3b performance rpi3b powersave
100 objects present
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
1kB 10kB
En
er
gy
 [µ
W
h]
1kB 10kB
Fig. 13: Secure storage, energy to iterate (top) and rename (bottom)
Secure storage breakdown
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cr
ea
te
 fi
le
W
rit
e 
file
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
[%
] 100
0
100
0
1kB 1. open dir
2. get temp file handle
3. open
4. write
5. sync htree
6. set name
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cr
ea
te
 fi
le
W
rit
e 
file
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
[%
]
10kB
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cr
ea
te
 fi
le
W
rit
e 
file
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
[%
]
100kB
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cr
ea
te
 fi
le
W
rit
e 
file
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
[%
]
1MB
on
de
ma
nd
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
po
we
rsa
ve
Cr
ea
te
 fi
le
W
rit
e 
file
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
[%
]
1. open dir
2. write
3. sync htree
4. update hash
5. commit
6. sync
on
de
ma
nd
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
po
we
rsa
ve
Cr
ea
te
 fi
le
W
rit
e 
file
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
[%
]
on
de
ma
nd
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
po
we
rsa
ve
Cr
ea
te
 fi
le
W
rit
e 
file
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
[%
]
on
de
ma
nd
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
po
we
rsa
ve
Cr
ea
te
 fi
le
W
rit
e 
file
Ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
[%
]
Fig. 14: Secure storage breakdown for two operations: create and write
cores, we observe an increase of energy consumption. Overall, in this benchmark the
ondemand governor is the most energy eager. This can be explained by the fact that ad-
justing the core frequencies (from 600MHz and 1.2GHz) seems to be a relatively costly
operation [41].
Thermal benchmarks. We conclude our evaluation by looking at the thermal en-
velope of the SoC. To do so, we execute 8 concurrent instances of the prime benchmark
inside TRUSTZONE. Figure 16 presents the measurements fetched using the kernel’s
thermals API. Additionally, we monitor the surface temperature of the chip using a
Texas Instruments LM35 precision linear sensor with the help of an external micro
controller. Thermal conductivity between the SoC and the LM35 is ensured by using
a thermal compound (Arctic MX-4[3]). The ambient temperature is of around 21.9°C.
Results returned by the LM35 are calibrated and checked at rest against a Fluke thermo-
couple, and against a Flir E4 [17] thermal camera (see pictures in Figure 17). Marked
points in Figure 16 refer to measurements done using the thermal camera. We observe
a small margin of error of 3°C, and a discrepancy between the thermals API and the
LM35 of over 15°C at times. This could be problematic because the measured surface
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CPU temperature during prime benchmark
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Fig. 16: Evolution of CPU temperature with different cooling modes and governors.
temperature exceeds the rated continuous temperature of 85°C specified by the chip’s
manufacturer. In this situation, the thermals API returns an incorrect temperature that
is well below the acceptable temperature. As a consequence measures which should be
taken to reduce the temperature, such as software thermal throttling, are not undertaken.
A passively cooled Raspberry Pi should therefore only operate in powersave mode or
risk being hardware throttled or worse, suffer damage. An actively cooled system on the
other hand can operate in any mode and stay well within acceptable conditions, even
without additional heat sink. Once the maximal temperature is reached, recovery time
is around 8 minutes when passively cooled and less than a minute with active cooling.
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Fig. 17: Raspberry Pi thermal behaviour during processor stress benchmarks.
5 Lessons Learned
This section reports on a few lessons learned during this experimental work.
Memory limitations. By default, 32MB are dedicated to OP-TEE, of which: 1MB
for TEE memory, 1MB for PUB (non-secure RAM) memory, and the remaining 30MB
for TAs. Each TA has two compile-time options, TA STACK SIZE and TA DATA SIZE
(in user ta header defines.h), defining the stack size and heap size that can be utilized
by a TA. These values are set at very low values by default, 2kB and 32kB respec-
tively [25]. For larger memory allocations, the TA’s MMU L1 table must be set accord-
ingly, as the default mapping is 1MB. We were unable to allocate more than 3MB for
a single TA, even with shared memory enabled. Consequently, the OP-TEE benchmark
framework [9] could not be used.
Compliance to standards.The GlobalPlatform’s implementation in OP-TEE is not
error-free and some parts of the implementation do not comply fully with the specifica-
tion. For instance, the TEE BigIntAdd [57, p. 252] function, contrary to its definition,
does not allow to use the same pointers for both input and output [37]. Being rela-
tively new, OP-TEE is improving rapidly. While this offers great advantages, such as
mitigations against the latest attacks, it also introduces incompatibilities by deprecating
older APIs. However, the GlobalPlatform consortium offers strong incentives for TEE
vendors to comply with their API, which is unlikely to introduce breaking changes.
Establishing this level of compliance ensures interoperability of TAs between existing
TEE solutions which is undeniably of great interest to secure application developers.
Developers toolchain. The OP-TEE framework groups all required dependencies
in a single project while also including several components of its own, such as the
secure kernel. This greatly facilitates development of secure application by reducing
setup and development efforts. The OP-TEE project includes a few TA examples and
host applications, which are a good foundation to introduce the TEE paradigm.
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6 Conclusion
TRUSTZONE is a widely available technology that offers Trusted Execution Environ-
ment guarantees to low-energy devices. The goal of this practical experience report was
to uncover the performance of these systems. To perform our experiments, we had to
extend both secure and rich kernels so that secure timing measurements and thermal
metrics could be fetched from within TRUSTZONE, for which we provide detailed ex-
planations in Appendix A. Our work highlights several advantages as well as limitation
of the currently available software platforms, such as the OP-TEE framework chosen in
our case, to implement and deploy TAs. We would like to point out two major limita-
tions. (1) the lack of several basic features inside the REE kernel for security reasons,
which materialize in the lack of basic syscalls (e.g. fopen, msgget). For this reason,
it is paramount to reduce syscall dependencies when developing TAs. (2), the current
limitations regarding memory allocation and addressing, which could negatively affect
the facility to deploy more complex TAs inside TRUSTZONE. We hope this work will
provide useful insights to TRUSTZONE software developers.
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A Appendix: Extending the Kernel
First, a new file containing the syscall used to retrieve the processor temperature getc-
putemp is created.
1 // populates temp with the CPU temperature in [m degC]
2 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getcputemp, unsigned long *, temp)
3 {
4 struct thermal_zone_device *tzd;
5 // The name "bcm2835_thermal" is obtained
6 // from /sys/class/thermal/thermal_zone0/type
7 tzd = thermal_zone_get_zone_by_name("bcm2835_thermal");
8 if (IS_ERR(tzd))
9 return 1;
10 thermal_zone_get_temp(tzd, &temp);
11 return 0;
12 }
Listing 1.1: linux/custom/custom.c
This file must be referenced in the main kernel Makefile:
1 core-y += kernel/ [...] custom/
Listing 1.2: linux/custom/Makefile
The syscall must be included in syscalls.h:
1 asmlinkage long sys_getcputemp(unsigned long *temp);
Listing 1.3: linux/include/linux/syscalls.h
The CALL macro is used in unistd.h:
1 CALL(sys_getcputemp)
Listing 1.4: linux/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
Use the next available syscall identifier:
1 #define __NR_getcputemp (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+394)
Listing 1.5: linux/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
In the following file and in addition to the modification listed above, note that -
NR syscalls must be incremented by one.
1 #define __NR_getcputemp 288
2 __SYSCALL(__NR_getcputemp, sys_getcputemp)
Listing 1.6: linux/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
At this point the new syscall is available to all user-mode applications running in
TEE (Figure 2-Ì and Figure 2-Í). This syscall is then exposed in the REE kernel, tee-
supplicant and the TEE kernel as if it were an official GlobalPlatform’s API function
definition.
1 unsigned long TEE_GetCpuTemperature(void);
Listing 1.7: optee os/lib/libutee/include/tee api.h
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The NR syscalls value must be modified to account for the new syscall:
1 #define __NR_syscalls <INCREASE_BY_ONE>
Listing 1.8: linux/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
The TEE function is a wrapper for the corresponding libutee implementation:
1 unsigned long TEE_GetCpuTemperature(void)
2 {
3 unsigned long ret;
5 TEE_Result res = utee_get_temperature(&ret);
7 if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
8 TEE_Panic(res);
10 return ret;
11 }
Listing 1.9: optee os/lib/libutee/tee api.c
TEE SCN MAX must also be increased accordingly and the call is given the next
unique identifier (71 in our case):
1 #define TEE_SCN_GET_TEMPERATURE 71
2 #define TEE_SCN_MAX <INCREASE_BY_ONE>
Listing 1.10: optee os/lib/libutee/include/tee syscall numbers.h
The utee syscall is declared in utee syscalls.h and linked to its unique identifier:
1 TEE_Result utee_get_temperature(unsigned long *temp);
Listing 1.11: optee os/lib/libutee/include/utee syscalls.h
1 UTEE_SYSCALL utee_get_temperature, TEE_SCN_GET_TEMPERATURE, 1
Listing 1.12: optee os/lib/libutee/arch/arm/utee syscalls asm.S
Add the syscall entry in arch svc.c. The trailing comma is required.
1 SYSCALL_ENTRY(syscall_get_temperature),
Listing 1.13: optee os/core/arch/arm/tee/arch svc.c
1 TEE_Result syscall_get_temperature(unsigned long *temp);
Listing 1.14: optee os/core/include/tee/tee svc.h
This function serves as a wrapper to the REE kernel syscall used to retrieve the
temperature:
1 #include <kernel/tee_temperature.h>
2 TEE_Result syscall_get_temperature(unsigned long *temp)
3 {
4 tee_ta_get_temperature(temp);
6 return TEE_SUCCESS;
7 }
Listing 1.15: optee os/core/tee/tee svc.c
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A new file is created:
1 #ifndef TEE_TEMPERATURE_H
2 #define TEE_TEMPERATURE_H
4 #include "tee_api_types.h"
6 TEE_Result tee_ta_get_temperature(unsigned long *temp);
8 #endif
Listing 1.16: optee os/core/include/kernel/tee temperature.h
This function is called in 8 and triggers a REE world switch 7 :
1 #include <compiler.h>
2 #include <string.h>
3 #include <stdlib.h>
4 #include <optee_msg.h>
5 #include <kernel/thread.h>
6 #include <kernel/tee_temperature.h>
8 TEE_Result tee_ta_get_temperature(unsigned long *temp)
9 {
10 TEE_Result res;
11 struct optee_msg_param params;
13 memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
14 params.attr = OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_OUTPUT;
15 res = thread_rpc_cmd(OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_GET_TEMPERATURE, 1, &params);
17 if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
18 *temp = params.u.value.a;
19 }
21 return res;
22 }
Listing 1.17: optee os/core/arch/arm/kernel/tee temperature.c
The following line in added in sub.mk:
1 srcs-y += tee_temperature.c
Listing 1.18: optee os/core/arch/arm/kernel/sub.mk
A new message used to retrieve the temperature via RPC is declared:
1 // [out] temperature
2 #define OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_GET_TEMPERATURE 21
Listing 1.19: optee os/core/include/optee msg.h
The same is done in another file:
1 // [out] temperature
2 #define OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_GET_TEMPERATURE 21
Listing 1.20: linux/drivers/tee/optee/optee msg.h
This function is declared inside the REE kernel:
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1 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
3 static void handle_get_temperature(struct optee_msg_arg *arg)
4 {
5 unsigned long cputemperature;
7 // Linux kernel syscall
8 if (sys_getcputemp(&cputemperature)) {
9 arg-ret = TEEC_ERROR_GENERIC;
10 return;
11 }
13 arg->params[0].u.value.a = cputemperature;
14 arg->ret = TEEC_SUCCESS;
15 return;
16 }
Listing 1.21: linux/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c
In the same file, handle rpc func cmd is modified by adding a case to handle the
new RPC request:
1 case OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_GET_TEMPERATURE:
2 handle_get_temperature(arg);
3 break;
Listing 1.22: linux/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c
After rebuilding the TEE client and kernel, the new syscall can be used as such from
any TA 9 :
1 float tempC = TEE_GetCpuTemperature() / 1000.0f;
Listing 1.23: Usage from TA
This solution perfectly illustrates a workaround to the starvation of the REE world
caused by the execution of the TEE.
In order to accomplish the secure storage micro benchmark, it was required to mea-
sure monotonic time, store and retrieve these measurements. The common denominator
between the TEE kernel and the host application is the REE kernel. For this reason, it
was decided to store measurements in the REE kernel, from which they could be gath-
ered by the host application. Three syscalls were added in the REE kernel and made
available in the TEE kernel.
These are first declared:
1 #define __NR_ktraceadd (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+396)
2 #define __NR_ktraceget (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+397)
3 #define __NR_ktracereset (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+398)
Listing 1.24: linux/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
1 CALL(sys_ktraceadd)
2 CALL(sys_ktraceget)
3 CALL(sys_ktracereset)
Listing 1.25: linux/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
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1 // save the current time as the specified id
2 asmlinkage long sys_ktraceadd(unsigned long id);
3 // returns the id+sec+ns of the requested index
4 asmlinkage long sys_ktraceget(unsigned long index, unsigned long* id,
5 unsigned long* sec, unsigned long* ns);
6 asmlinkage long sys_ktracereset(void);
Listing 1.26: linux/include/linux/syscalls.h
Implementation is stored in a separate file:
1 #include <linux/kernel.h>
2 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
3 #include <linux/timekeeping.h>
4 #include <linux/slab.h>
6 #define MAX_KTRACE_ENTRIES 30
7 unsigned char ktrace_entries = 0;
9 struct ktraceadd_e {
10 unsigned long id;
11 struct timespec64 ts;
12 };
14 struct ktraceadd_e* ktraceadd_d;
16 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(ktraceadd, unsigned long, id)
17 {
18 struct timespec64 ts;
19 ts = ns_to_timespec64(ktime_get_ns());
21 if (!ktraceadd_d) {
22 ktraceadd_d = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ktraceadd_e)*MAX_KTRACE_ENTRIES,
23 GFP_KERNEL | GFP_NOWAIT);
24 }
26 if (ktrace_entries < MAX_KTRACE_ENTRIES) {
27 memcpy((void*)&ktraceadd_d[ktrace_entries].id, (void*)&id, sizeof(unsigned
↪→ long));
28 memcpy((void*)&ktraceadd_d[ktrace_entries].ts, (void*)&ts, sizeof(struct
↪→ timespec64));
29 ktrace_entries++;
30 return 0;
31 }
33 return 1;
34 }
36 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ktraceget, unsigned long, index, unsigned long*, id, unsigned long*,
↪→ sec, unsigned long*, ns)
37 {
38 if (ktraceadd_d && index >= 0 && index < ktrace_entries) {
39 *id = ktraceadd_d[index].id;
40 *sec = ktraceadd_d[index].ts.tv_sec;
41 *ns = ktraceadd_d[index].ts.tv_nsec;
42 return 0;
43 }
45 return 1;
46 }
48 SYSCALL_DEFINE0(ktracereset)
49 {
50 ktrace_entries = 0;
51 return 0;
52 }
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Listing 1.27: linux/custom/custom.c
Next, three available syscalls identifiers are used. In the same file, NR syscalls
must be incremented by three.
1 #define __NR_ktraceadd 290
2 __SYSCALL(__NR_ktraceadd, sys_ktraceadd)
3 #define __NR_ktraceget 291
4 __SYSCALL(__NR_ktraceget, sys_ktraceget)
5 #define __NR_ktracereset 292
6 __SYSCALL(__NR_ktracereset, sys_ktracereset)
Listing 1.28: linux/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
The NR syscalls value must be modified to account for the new syscalls:
1 #define __NR_syscalls <INCREASE_BY_THREE>
Listing 1.29: linux/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
These functions can now be invoked from any REE user-mode application. Instru-
mentation tests test1 and test2 are added directly from the host application using 3 ,
and then retrieved and displayed.
1 #include <unistd.h>
2 #include <sys/syscall.h>
3 #include <time.h>
5 // As defined in
6 // optee/linux/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
7 #define SYSCALL_KTRCEADD 290
8 #define SYSCALL_KTRCEGET 291
9 #define SYSCALL_KTRCERESET 292
11 printf("Calling SYSCALL_KTRCERESET\n");
12 syscall(SYSCALL_KTRCERESET);
14 printf("Calling SYSCALL_KTRCEADD 0\n");
15 syscall(SYSCALL_KTRCEADD, "test1");
16 sleep(1);
17 printf("Calling SYSCALL_KTRCEADD 1\n");
18 syscall(SYSCALL_KTRCEADD, "test2");
20 char kget_name[20];
21 unsigned long kget_sec;
22 unsigned long kget_ns;
24 for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i) {
25 syscall(SYSCALL_KTRCEGET, i, &kget_name, &kget_sec, &kget_ns);
26 printf("SYSCALL_KTRCEGET index %d: name=%s sec=%ld ns=%ld\n",
27 i, kget_name, kget_sec, kget_ns);
28 }
Listing 1.30: Host application usage example
Trace calls can then be added anywhere in the REE core 8 . Once called, an RPC is
made 7 to the REE kernel. For example:
1 #include <kernel/tee_ktrace.h>
3 static TEE_Result ree_fs_create([...])
4 {
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5 TEE_Result res;
7 // Measuring instrumentation delay
8 tee_ta_add_ktrace(200);
9 tee_ta_add_ktrace(201);
11 // Measuring time taken to enter the monitor
12 mutex_lock(&ree_fs_mutex);
13 tee_ta_add_ktrace(202);
15 // [...]
16 }
Listing 1.31: optee os/core/tee/tee ree fs.c
